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1.1  Introduction 
Our aim is first to explain why Indonesia did not experience an external 
debt  crisis  in  the  1982-84  period  as  did  most  of  the  Latin  American 
countries, and  then on the basis of the analysis make recommendations to 
deal with Indonesia’s present debt situation. We  hope that the lessons drawn 
will be useful as well in the design of adjustment policies for other countries 
experiencing debt-servicing difficulties. While a great deal of  this  mono- 
graph is about the conduct of economic policies and their consequences, our 
study goes beyond the normal economic analysis by  giving detailed attention 
to the Indonesian historical and political setting within which decisions about 
policies are made. 
Specifically,  the  questions  we  are  interested  in  are:  What  were  the 
economic policies adopted, and what have been  the results? What are the 
different strategies for economic development considered by  the Indonesian 
government? What is the political and economic basis for each strategy and 
what  is  its  distributional  implication? What  are  the  reasons a  particular 
strategy was chosen and then subsequently superceded? Finally, even though 
the actual combination of  strategies warded  off  a debt crisis in  1982-84, 
how likely is an external debt crisis in the near future, taking into account 
the present economic policies and the political dynamics in Indonesia? 
In the course of  answering these questions, we  conclude that the major 
reason for the absence of  a debt crisis was the satisfactory management of 
the exchange rate. This task was  made easier because there were  neither 
burgeoning budget  deficits nor  extended periods  of  loss  of  control  over 
monetary  growth. The absence of  protracted exchange rate  overvaluation 
from 1979 onward was fundamental in maintaining a strong nonoil tradable 
sector. The nonoil tradable sector was able to earn enough foreign exchange 
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to service Indonesian  debts  when  the  external  shock of  high  interest  rates 
increased debt-service payments and the recession in industrialized countries 
lowered  the  price  of  oil. We  also want  to  emphasize that  the  absence  of 
extended  exchange  rate  overvaluation  kept  the  external  debt down by  not 
encouraging capital flight. We ascribe this use of the exchange rate to protect 
the  tradable  sector  as  much  to  the  existence  of  an  influential  political 
constituency consisting of  (comparatively) neoclassical economists, Javanese 
peasantry,  and  Outer Island residents,  as to balance-of-payments  consider- 
ations. 
This monograph  is  organized  as  follows:  chapters  2  and  3  explore  the 
historical and political dimensions of economic policymaking,  and chapter 4 
verifies  the  veracity  of  our political  economy  approach  by  analyzing  the 
distributional  consequences  of  the  fiscal  system.  Chapter  5  reviews  the 
conduct of monetary policy and finds that the choice of the monetary control 
mechanism in the 1970s was influenced by political economy considerations. 
Chapter 6 shows how exchange rate management since November  1978 has 
been sensitive to both the economic viability of the agricultural export sector 
and the balance-of-payments position. The difficulties that political economy 
considerations imposed on external debt management  are illustrated by  the 
Pertamina  crisis  discussed  in  chapter  7.  Chapter  8  identifies  three 
factors-concessional  loans,  prudent  debt  management,  and  export 
orientation-responsible  for the  non-crisis  outcome in  1982-84,  and  then 
discusses the role for policy in ensuring a non-crisis outcome in the medium 
run. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we give a summary of  each 
of the succeeding chapters. 
1.2  Political and Economic Instability, 1950-65 
An understanding of  the economic conditions prior to the establishment of 
the  New  Order  government  in  1966  is  important because  the  economic 
policies of the  1950-65  period left a very strong imprint on the institutional 
memory of the new government, especially insofar as it resides in the person 
of  President  Soeharto. During this period,  the Indonesian  government  was 
preoccupied  with  domestic  political  and  military  problems,  with  the 
restoration  of  sovereignty on West  Irian,  and  with political  recognition  in 
world  forums.  Little  attention  and  resources  were  devoted  to  economic 
development. 
An increasingly  difficult budget situation made inflation a major problem. 
Taxes  on  trade  were  the  major  source  of  government  revenue,  but  the 
overvalued multiple  exchange rate system was reducing  the profitability  of 
the tradable sector, causing it to shrink. The twin rebellions on  the islands of 
Sumatra and Sulawesi in  1958 constituted a simultaneous supply and demand 
shock  to  the  budget.  The  rebellions  forced  big  increases  in  military 
expenditure,  at the same time reducing the  government  revenue base  since 
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both  of  these  islands were  important  sources of  export  tax  revenue.  The 
monetization of the budget deficits raised the average 1958-61  inflation rate 
to 25 percent from the  1950-57  average of  17 percent. 
The budgetary pressures grew steadily worse, resulting in a period of even 
higher inflation in  1962-65.  Between  1962 and  1964 both  money supply 
and the cost-of-living index roughly doubled every year, and by  the end of 
1965 they were doubling every few weeks. Economic growth slowed to 0.8 
percent per year in this turbulent period. The evolution of  the export/GDP 
ratio tells the story of  economic decline very well; it fell from 8.7 percent 
(1951-57)  to 6.8 percent (1958-61),  and then to  1.1 percent (1962-65). 
The  internal  political  struggle  culminated  with  the  abortive  coup  by 
military personnel sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party (Purtai 
Kommunis  Indonesia  or  PKI)  on  the  night  of  30  September  1965.  The 
political  instability  aggravated  the  economic  instability.  The  increasing 
economic difficulties speeded up  the  transfer of  authority  from  President 
Soekarno to the anti-communist General Soeharto in the following year. 
1.3  The Political Economy Factors in Policymaking 
The economic chaos of  the  1958-65  period left such a deep impression 
that the new  Soeharto government has had a “balanced”  budget rule since 
1968. In  reality, this rule amounts to refusing to finance the deficit through 
money creation and limiting the deficit to the availability of  foreign loans, 
which are officially described as foreign “revenue.”’  Another consequence 
of  the  chaos  was  the  recognition  that  the  exchange rate  is  an  extremely 
potent policy instrument that can effect large-scale, economy-wide resource 
reallocation and income redistribution. 
President Soeharto has been  in  power  since October  1965 and  has  not 
faced any serious challenges to his rule since the 1974 riots. The Indonesian 
political system can  be  described as  a  corporatist-authoritarian state.  We 
were  able  to  identify  three  political  concerns  that  have  significantly 
influenced his choice of  economic policies. The first is to avoid conditions 
favorable to the revival of  the PKI. Since the PKI was primarily a Javanese 
peasant-based  movement,  the  policy  implication is  that  conditions in  the 
rural  area must  be  improved. The  second concern is to  display equitable 
treatment  of  the  Outer  Islands,  given  their  long  history  of  secessionist 
movements. Since the economy of the Outer Islands depends heavily on tree 
crop exports,  this  further  strengthens the  case  for  promoting agricultural 
development. It must be added that Soeharto, because of his peasant origin, 
has  consistently shown a strong personal  commitment to eliminating rural 
poverty.  Soeharto’s  third  concern  is  one  common  to  all  politicians: the 
maintenance of  his power base. 
Political patronage has often taken the form of trade restrictions to benefit 
specific  groups.  It  would  not  be  correct,  however,  to  attribute  all  trade 
restrictions to  rent-seeking  motivation.  Ideology  also  plays  an  important 
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role. Soeharto, like most members of the 1945 generation who fought in the 
bitter  war  for  independence  from  the  Netherlands,  is  influenced  by  an 
economic nationalism which is congruous with Indonesian political national- 
ism. Dutch economic policies were seen as designed to impose a plantation 
economy on Indonesia to serve the need of  Dutch manufacturing industries 
for raw  materials. In  reaction, the generation of  1945 regards industrializa- 
tion as synonymous with economic development. The policy translations of 
economic nationalism are high trade barriers to induce the development of  a 
manufacturing sector and foreign investment laws more strict than those of 
neighboring countries. 
The primary reason Indonesia sometimes pursues a contradictory mix of 
liberal  and  protectionist  policies  is  the  above  political,  ideological, 
pecuniary, and personal elements working themselves through two groups of 
contending  presidential  economic  advisors,  popularly  referred  to  as  the 
technocrats and the technicians. The technocrats are neoclassical economists 
who  subscribe to  the  comparative advantage principle.  This  has  meant  a 
favorable treatment of  the agricultural sector because it supplies about 80 
percent  of  nonoil  exports.  Exchange  rate  devaluations,  rather  than  the 
removal of trade restrictions on imported inputs, are used to promote exports 
because the technocrats control the ministries that oversee macroeconomic 
policies but not the Ministry of  Trade and the Ministry of  Industry which 
have  authority over  trade  restrictions.  Their  policies  find  favor  with  the 
president because they address his political concerns for raising rural income 
and for maintaining equitable treatment of the main islands. 
The second group of economic advisors, the technicians, is an amorphous 
collection of technicians-turned-managers, military advisors, and economists 
with structuralist inclinations. The technicians are united by  their common 
belief  in the general validity of  the infant industry argument and by  their 
common rejection of  foreign capital ownership.  The technicians’ push for 
import-substitution industrialization has won them the support of  the army, 
the most powerful constituency in the country. Thanks to the dual function 
(dwifungsi) doctrine  which  legitimizes military  participation  in  economic 
development, the expansion of  state enterprises translates directly into more 
managerial  positions for senior  military  personnel.  It  must  be  noted  that 
since most of the import-competing industries are set up in urban Java, the 
higher prices of manufactured goods represent an implicit tax on residents of 
the rural sector and the Outer Islands. 
In  looking at the political setting within  which policies are chosen,  we 
have  identified  an  important  political  coalition  of  technocrats,  Outer 
Islanders, and rural residents which favors a policy package emphasizing the 
maintenance of a competitive exchange rate. Since a debt crisis occurs when 
a government runs out of  foreign reserves-either  to service its guaranteed 
external  debts  or  to  permit  private  residents  to  convert  their  domestic 
currency to service private external debts-such  a policy  package reduces 
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the probability of  a debt crisis by keeping the (foreign exchange earning) 
nonoil export sector healthy. 
1.4  The Fiscal System 
The  most  notable  feature  of  the  1970s  is  the  central  government’s 
increasing reliance on oil as its chief source of  revenue. Oil revenue as a 
share of total federal revenue rose from 26 percent in  1969/70 to peak at 71 
percent  in  1981/82. Nonoil  revenue  normalized  by  GDP  fell  from  the 
1969-71  average of  8 percent to the  1980-82  average of  6 percent. The 
fiscal danger of  such a narrow tax base was  brought home dramatically in 
1982 when the global recession caused oil prices to collapse. Oil revenue (in 
1980 rupiahs)  fell  from  Rp  7.8  billion  in  1981182 to  Rp  6.9  billion  in 
1982/83, causing  real  total  revenue  to  fall  for  the  first  time  since  the 
Soekamo years. 
It was clear that greater internal resource mobilization was necessary. A 
completely revised personal and corporate income tax code came into force 
in  January  1984,  a  value-added  tax  in  April  1985, and  a  consolidated 
property tax in  1986. The result was that real (1980 prices) nonoil revenue 
rose from Rp 3.6 billion in fiscal 1983 to Rp 4.7 billion in fiscal 1986. It is 
important to note that the oil revenue contributed to  “undertaxation”  in  a 
subtle way which led to greater external debt accumulation. The two OPEC 
price  increases  encouraged  undertaxation by  giving  Indonesia  access  to 
external credit on very favorable terms. 
The  examination  of  the  fiscal  system  supports  our  claim  that  the 
technocrats favor an economic strategy which leads to resource transfers to 
the Javanese rural areas and to the tree crop industries in the Outer Islands. 
This  favorable  tax  treatment  of  the  agricultural  sector  improves  the 
rural-urban terms of trade and hence encourages the production of tradables, 
the presence of  which determines a country’s ability to service its debts. 
In  examining  government expenditure, we  surmised  from  fragmentary 
evidence that government spending was more likely to display a rural rather 
than  an  urban  bias.  Because  of  better  data,  stronger evidence could  be 
garnered  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  budget  allocations  were  very 
sensitive to  inter-island equity.  There is  in  fact evidence that  inter-island 
equity takes precedence over rural-urban equity. This is consistent with our 
conjecture that concern for rural development stems more from a desire to 
eradicate poverty than to narrow the rural-urban gap. 
The analysis in  chapter 4 sets the stage for our discussion in  which we 
determine that political economy factors have been important in determining 
the debt outcome. To  the extent that people are consistent in  their actions, 
the fact that the technocrats implemented, with Soeharto’s approval, a fiscal 
policy  favoring the tradable sector means that they would also advocate a 
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similarly-oriented exchange rate policy. Such an exchange rate policy, as we 
will see, yields side effects that are salutary to external debt servicing. 
1.5  Monetary Policy and Financial Structure 
While the balanced  budget policy of  the Soeharto government effectively 
ended the creation of money to finance budget deficits, it could not prevent 
monetary policy from moving in tandem with fiscal policy during the 1970s. 
This is because the main instrument for monetary control prior to April 1974 
was  the  extension  of  central  bank  credits  to  the  banking  system,  state 
enterprises,  and private companies.  Since these credits were extended for a 
contracted  time  period,  the government  was  not  in  a position  to engineer 
quick increases or reductions of  the money  stock. This meant that with the 
maintenance  of  a  fixed  dollar-rupiah  exchange rate, the  conversion  of  oil 
revenue  from  dollars  to  rupiahs  in  order to finance expanded  government 
expenditure automatically increased the money supply. Thus, when the price 
of oil quadrupled at the end of 1973, encouraging the government to increase 
its  spending,  the  monetary  authorities  lost  control  of  the  money  supply. 
Reserve money grew 57 percent in  1974 and the inflation rate for that year 
was  41  percent.  The central bank  responded  to this  monetary  anarchy  by 
setting lending ceilings on the banking system in April  1974. 
It  is  understandable  to  use  lending  ceilings  as  a  short-run,  stopgap 
measure to control monetary growth, but  Indonesia continued  to rely  upon 
them  for  monetary  control  until  June  1983,  despite  their  well-known 
deleterious effects. The reason is that credit ceilings gave the government an 
additional  instrument  to  consolidate  its  political  base.  Over  time,  Bank 
Indonesia was instructed to introduce detailed ceilings by  type of credit for 
each bank through an extensive selective credit system featuring subsidized 
interest  rates  to achieve  other goals. For  example, banks  were  assigned  a 
civic  function  insofar  as  they  restricted  certain  credit  only  to pribumis 
(indigenous people) and made establishing credit for them a priority in order 
to enhance pribumi participation in economic activities. The highest priority 
items were financing rural participation  in the government’s rice intensifica- 
tion program  and financing  the  scheme to stabilize the price of rice.  Since 
most priority credits were handled by state banks, the policy of ceilings with 
selective credit became one of the major tools protecting the state banks from 
competition with private banks.  Since state banks also had a wider network 
of  branch  offices  than  the  private  banks,  the  result  of  choosing  this 
mechanism  of  monetary  control  was  the  preservation  of  the  dominant 
position of the state banks. In the absence of  pressures to innovate in order to 
be more efficient, the Indonesian financial system remained underdeveloped. 
One of the policy  responses  to the external  shocks of  the  1980s was an 
overhaul of  the financial  structure which was announced in June 1983. The 
financial  refom  package  included  partial  deregulation  of  interest  rates, 
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elimination of credit ceilings, and reduction in the scope of Bank Indonesia's 
subsidized credits to state-owned banks. To  increase the number of central 
bank  instruments  for  open  market  operations,  Bank  Indonesia  began 
reissuing Debt Certificates (SBIs) in February  1984 and introduced Money 
Market Instruments (SBPUs) in January 1985. 
It is clear that the financial instruments SBI and SBPU still did not provide 
sufficient control over monetary aggregates. This is evident in the way the 
money supply had to be contracted in response to a speculative run on the 
rupiah in  June  1987. The minister of  planning,  in addition to asking Bank 
Indonesia to sell Rp 800 billion of open market instruments, ordered the state 
enterprises to withdraw Rp 1.3 trillion from state banks to be put into central 
bank securities. 
This action reveals that the market for both SBI and SBPU was still too 
shallow.  It  may  be  difficult to  increase their role  if  the financial markets 
remain underdeveloped. Financial deepening is an important priority, but not 
only  because  of  the  need  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  monetary 
instruments.  Financial deepening  would  also  better  mobilize  (and  maybe 
increase)  domestic  saving,  reduce  dependence  on  external  credit,  and 
improve the overall allocation of  capital within  the economy.  A boost  to 
financial deepening would be the privatization of  some of  the state-owned 
enterprises,  and  an  easing of  external debt  service would  be  achieved if 
foreigners were allowed to buy into these enterprises. 
1.6  Exchange Rate Policy 
Indonesian exchange rate policy is characterized by  three distinct phases 
during the  1966-87  period.  In  the first phase,  from October  1966 to July 
1971, there was a steady dismantling of the multitiered exchange rate system 
into  a  unified  exchange  rate.  This  phase  revealed  a  readiness  to  have 
medium-sized  devaluations  at  short  intervals  in  order  to  restore  the 
competitiveness eroded by  higher inflation in  Indonesia. 
In the second phase, from August 1971 to October 1978, there was a fixed 
exchange rate. The reason for this remarkable stability is straightforward: the 
balance  of  payments  was  very  strong  throughout  the  period.  The  rapid 
development of  the oil sector together with the  1973 OPEC price increase 
caused Indonesian oil exports to grow as follows (in U.S.$ billion): 0.4 in 
1969, 0.9 in  1972, 5.2 in  1974, and  then  7.4 in  1978. The result was  a 
swelling of  the  nongold  reserves,  measured  in  the  number  of  weeks  of 
imports they could support: 8.1 in  1969, 19.1 in  1972, 20.2 in  1974, and 
20.4  in  1978. The  macroeconomic conditions  also  did  not  warrant  any 
additional  stimulus which  a devaluation would  bring.  The  sustained high 
income growth rates of  this period-7.9  percent  per  year-were  achieved 
with substantial overheating of the economy. The average 1973-78  inflation 
rate was 22 percent compared with 8 percent in 1970-72. 
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The  third  phase  involved  three  large  devaluations in  November  1978, 
March 1983, and September 1986, separated by moderately long periods of 
gradual  exchange  rate  depreciation.  There  are  two  mutually  compatible 
explanations for the 50  percent devaluation in  1978. The first explanation 
views the November 1978 devaluation primarily as an anticipatory action to 
the inevitable dropoff in oil export earnings due to resource depletion. 
The second explanation emphasizes the economic difficulties and political 
tensions associated with the reallocation of  resources being forced upon the 
economy by the overvalued exchange rate. The overvaluation of the rupiah 
was the result of  maintaining the exchange rate at 415 rupiahs to the dollar 
despite the large domestic inflations from  1974 to  1977. This meant  that 
Indonesian producers of  tradables were experiencing a profit  squeeze. The 
prices of their output were fixed by  international competition, but the prices 
of  their domestic inputs were being driven up by  the double-digit inflation. 
The  result  was  reports  of  increasing  unemployment  in  the  tradables 
industries,  particularly  in  the  labor-intensive  agricultural  export  sector. 
Indonesia  was  suffering  from  the  “Dutch  disease”.*  In  this  second 
explanation,  the  1978 devaluation was  as  much  due  to  political concern 
about worsening conditions in the countryside as to economic concern about 
the desirability of the resulting composition of economic activities. After all, 
the level of reserves in  1978 could sustain the existing amount of  imports 
much longer than was possible at any time during the  1969-76  period. 
It  must be stated that the deleterious effects of  the Dutch disease on the 
nonoil  export  sector  are  not  obvious.  Nonoil,  non-liquified  natural  gas 
(LNG) exports,  whether measured in physical units or in  dollars or in the 
units  of  imports  for  which  they  can  be  exchanged,  show  steady  growth 
throughout 1972-78.  The production disincentive faced by the nonoil export 
industries is  clearly  seen  only  when  the  local purchasing power  of  their 
exports is measured. Even though nonoil exports were bringing in increasing 
amounts of foreign goods, the steady real appreciation of the exchange rate 
meant that the nonoil export industries were not being paid a greater number 
of  baskets containing the mix of  goods typically consumed by  Indonesians. 
In  terms  of  foreign  purchasing  power,  these  industries  increased  their 
revenues by  32 percentage points between 1973 and 1978, but their revenues 
were unchanged if  measured in terms of local purchasing power. 
More direct evidence of  the production disincentive experienced by  the 
nonoil export sector is the movement of prices of  tradables relative to prices 
of  nontradables,  PT/PN.  Our  three  proxies  of  PT/PN  show  an  average 
decline of  29  percent  between  1973 and  1978.  The  50  percent  nominal 
exchange rate devaluation caused FT/PN to increase by  29 percent, almost 
restoring the profitability of the tradable sector. 
The  speed  and  size of  the  response  of  nonoil,  nonLNG  exports  were 
impressive. Export volume went up by  36 percent in one year, raising dollar 
earnings by  52 percent. The 32 percent growth in foreign purchasing power 
in  1979 translated into a domestic purchasing power increase of  78 percent. 
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We  interpret the quick and large response to the devaluation as proof  of 
the Dutch  disease,  the  mounting  severity of  which  since  1974 caused an 
increase  in  excess  capacity  in  the  traditional  export  industries.  Small 
producers  of  tree  crops  were  spending more  and  more  of  their  time  in 
nontradable  activities.  Meanwhile,  the  real  prices  of  their  agricultural 
products sank as a constant nominal exchange rate was maintained  in  the 
face of  big domestic price increases. 
The March  1983 and September  1986 devaluations were  undertaken to 
boost  nonoil  exports  in  the  face  of  big  declines  in  oil  export  earnings. 
Manufacturing exports grew very rapidly after the March 1983 devaluation. 
They jumped (in U.S.$  million) from 850 in fiscal 1982 to  1,480 in fiscal 
1983, and then to 2,166 in fiscal 1984. The strong export responses to the 
1978 and 1983 devaluations indicate that export-oriented industrialization is 
a real possibility as long as favorable relative prices are maintained through 
appropriate exchange rate and trade policies. 
While  it  is  clear  that  negative  external  demand  shock  had  a  role  in 
worsening the balance of payments from 1983 to 1986, we want to point out 
that  there  were  also internal developments during this  period  that  caused 
substantial movements  in  relative  prices  which  were  unfavorable  for  the 
tradable  sector.  Specifically,  we  are  refemng  to  the  widespread  use  of 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) in the 1980s. Of  the 5,229 items imported in 
1985,  1,484 required  import  licenses  and  296  were  under  quotas.  The 
import licenses were usually given to only two or three traders or to the few 
firms  producing  the  competing  goods  domestically  and  thus  conferred  a 
monopoly  position  to  their  holders.  The  range  of  activities  that  were 
protected by import licenses accounted for 32 percent of total domestic value 
added, excluding construction and services. If  the petroleum sector, which 
requires no protection, is also excluded, then the coverage is 53 percent of 
total domestic value added. 
The  implication  of  this  microeconomic  distortion  for  exchange  rate 
management is profound. The intrusion of this distortion since late 1982 and 
its quick metastasis across the tradable sector renders invalid trying to draw 
conclusions about production incentive by  examining the movements of  the 
macroeconomic proxies  for  FT/PN.  Output prices of  tradables are set by 
international competition,  while output prices  of  nontradables (which  are 
generally very  labor-intensive) are set by  the domestic cost  structure, the 
level of  which is primarily determined by domestic wages on the supply side 
and domestic macro conditions on the demand side. Hence, the introduction 
of  a  quota  on  an  imported  input  to  the  tradable  sector  will  reduce  the 
profitability of  the tradable sector without any change in PT/PN. 
The point  we  want to emphasize is that  although the Morgan Guaranty 
competitiveness index in predevaluation 1986 shows almost the same value 
as in  postdevaluation  1979 (110 versus  Ill), it  does not  indicate that the 
August  1986 exchange rate was not overvalued. In  order to have the  1986 
nonoil  export  supply  schedule  in  the  same  position  within  the  familiar 
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Marshallian  price-quantity  space as in  1979, a devaluation was warranted, 
particularly  in light of the shrunken gap between output and input prices.  It 
is of  course an empirical  question  how  much the  additional  nonoil  export 
earnings would have been in the absence of QRs, especially in comparison to 
the fall in oil export earnings. The current  account deficit  would  still have 
widened  in  1986, but not to the same extent. 
1.7  External Debt Management 
The Soeharto government is  no  stranger  to external  debt  management, 
having inherited an external public debt of $2 billion.  It cut its teeth on the 
economic stabilization  and  rehabilitation  program  of  1966, within  which 
rescheduling  the  Soekarno debts and  arranging  for new  capital  inflows  to 
support the balance of payments were key components. Given the desperate 
situation of  Indonesia, the Western countries  set up the Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI) to ensure a long-term coordinated plan of official 
assistance.  IGGI  was  generous  both  in  the  amount  and  the  terms  of 
assistance. In the 1967-70  period, it gave an average of $477 million a year, 
with  a repayment  period  of  25  years, including  7  years  of  grace,  and  an 
interest rate of 3 percent. 
The mix of  generous external assistance and corrective economic policies 
undertaken  by  the  Soeharto government imparted a new  dynamism to the 
Indonesian economy. The annual average growth rate from 1968 to 1972 was 
8.2 percent compared to the average rate of  1.2 percent in the preceding five 
years.  By  1974 the  international  credit  markets  had  rescinded  whatever 
credit  restrictions  they  had  imposed  on  borrowing  by  the  Indonesian 
government  in  the  aftermath  of  Soekamo’s  economic  Armageddon.  The 
reasons  for this  change were  threefold:  one, the  avalanche  of  oil revenue 
increased the creditworthiness of the Indonesian government; two, there was 
a  boom  in  commodity  prices  in  the  early  1970s;  and,  three,  lending 
opportunities  decreased  in  OECD countries whose  medium-term  economic 
prospects were rather bleak after the  1973 OPEC price increase. 
On consumption-smoothing  grounds, readmission  into the external  credit 
market  resulted  in  a net  gain to Indonesian  national  welfare.  This welfare 
gain was not without its price: Indonesia was now exposed to two new risks. 
The first risk is systemic in nature and threatens every country with external 
debts. The second  is the possibility  of  imprudent  borrowing  by  Indonesia. 
This danger was  realized  in  February  1975 when  the  state oil  company, 
Pertamina, could not roll over a $400 million short-term loan and defaulted. 
It  could  be  cogently  argued  that  the  Pertamina crisis  was  a  blessing  in 
disguise.  The  government,  by  denying  all  state-owned  enterprises  direct 
access to the external credit market after the Pertamina embarrassment, did 
not have as large a publicly-guaranteed  external  debt as it otherwise would 
have had at the beginning of  1982. 
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While the Pertamina crisis was a deep one, it was still manageable.  Real 
interest  rates were  low  and  Indonesian exports were in  high  demand. The 
collapse of oil prices  since  1982 and the subsequent collapse of  commodity 
prices  have  made  external  debt  management  more  difficult.  1986  was  a 
particularly  bad  year  for Indonesia.  The price of  oil dropped  precipitously 
from  $28 per  barrel  in January  1986 to $10 in  August  1986. The yen,  in 
which more than a third of  Indonesian public external debt is denominated, 
appreciated  21  percent  against  the  dollar.  The  result  was  that  the  public 
debt-service ratio shot up to 29 percent  at the end of  1986. 
The  Indonesian  government  has  shown  itself  to  be  prepared  to  make 
significant policy changes to ward off an external debt crisis. The rupiah was 
devalued by 38 percent in March 1983 and by 45 percent in September 1986. 
In October 1986 and January  1987, the input costs to the export sector were 
lowered by  abolishing a substantial number of import restrictions.  Nominal 
state expenditure  for fiscal  1986 was reduced  8 percent  from the  previous 
year. In fact, real  government expenditure  has been  steadily  lowered  since 
fiscal  1983.  Real  expenditure  has  declined  more  than  the  drop  in  real 
revenue, reducing the amount of  real borrowing (in 1980 prices) from Rp 2.8 
billion in 1983 to Rp 2.1 billion in  1986. Mobilization of domestic resources 
was also undertaken to slash foreign borrowing,  with the income tax system 
completely overhauled in December  1983 and a value-added  tax introduced 
in  April  1985, followed  by  a more comprehensive  land  tax in June  1986. 
These tax increases, however, have not been able to make up for the fall in 
oil  royalties.  Nominal  revenue  in  1986 was Rp  1.4 billion  lower  than  in 
1985. 
1.8  Conclusions and Prospects 
As pointed out earlier, a debt crisis occurs not only when the government 
does not have the reserves  to service the  loans  it has  guaranteed,  but  also 
when  it does not have the  reserves  to enable private domestic residents to 
convert  their  service  payments  on  nonguaranteed  debts  from  domestic 
currency to foreign ~urrency.~  To  take the second cause of a debt crisis into 
consideration,  we define  the  total  external  debt  service  to be  the  sum  of 
external short-term debt and the debt service on all external long-term debt, 
publicly-guaranteed and private nonguaranteed.  We  include short-term debt 
in  our definition  because  we  are interested  in  the  financial  resilience  of  a 
country to sudden protracted credit squeezes in international credit markets 
which make short-term  borrowing extremely expensive,  if  not occasionally 
impossible.  After all, the  1973-74  credit  crunch did precipitate  the  1975 
Pertamina debt crisis in  Indonesia. 
Since the reserve position  of  a country is crucial for avoiding debt crises, 
it is not appropriate to assess a country’s ability to pay by looking at the total 
external  debt  service  with  respect  to  its  income.  A  more  appropriate 
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indicator  is  the  debt-service  ratio,  DSR-the  total  external  debt  service 
normalized by  the level of  exports-because  the official reserve position is 
determined primarily  by  the  ability  of  the  export  sector  to  earn  foreign 
exchange. 
By  comparing the DSRs of Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil, we  identified 
three factors that explain why Indonesia did not experience a debt crisis in 
1982-84  as did Mexico and  Brazil. These factors are concessional loans, 
high export orientation, and prudent management of the maturity structure. 
Concessional loans. A high  proportion of Indonesia’s external debt was 
borrowed  at  fixed  concessionary  rates  from  IGGI.  This  “IGGI  effect” 
explains why the effective interest rate on Indonesian long-run debt averaged 
16 percent against the 20 percent paid by Mexico and Brazil. Another result 
was that only about one-third of Indonesian debt was denominated in dollars 
compared to 90 percent of  Mexican and Brazilian debt. This meant that the 
large appreciation of the dollar from 1979 to 1982 did not raise the effective 
interest rate for Indonesia as much as it did for Mexico and Brazil. 
High export orientation.  The availability of  significant amounts of  other 
tradables prevented Indonesia’s debt-servicing capacity from collapsing as 
did  Mexico’s  when  the  price  of  oil  dropped  in  early  1982. Appropriate 
exchange rate policies by  Indonesia, exemplified by  the  1978 devaluation, 
ensured a diversified export bundle as well as a high export orientation. The 
average 1980-82  export/GNP ratio was 27 percent for Indonesia, but only 
14  percent  for  Mexico  and  9.5 percent  for  Brazil.  Indonesia’s  political 
concern to keep the agricultural sector vibrant no doubt helped to maintain 
the observed export orientation. 
Prudent  management of the maturity  structure.  This was evident in  that 
only 14 percent of Indonesia’s debt in  1981 was short-term compared to the 
19 percent for Brazil and 32 percent for Mexico. The shock of the Pertamina 
crisis caused official borrowing in Indonesia to take place very cautiously 
with regard to exposure in the short-term credit market. We  can also call this 
third factor the Pertamina legacy. 
To quantify the relative importance of  the three factors in explaining the 
absence of  an Indonesian debt crisis, we  calculated what the total DSRs in 
the 1980-82  period would have been if Indonesian debt was paying the same 
effective interest rates  as  Mexico,  as  well  as bearing  the  same  maturity 
structure, and if  the Indonesian exporVGNP ratio was identical to Mexico’s. 
The average values of the six possible decompositions of the effect of each 
factor  and  the  range  of  values  achieved  are  reported  in  table  1.1.  The 
decomposition  identifies  the  export  orientation  of  Indonesia  as  the  most 
decisive factor in why Indonesia’s total debt-service/export ratio was so low 
compared  with  Mexico’s.  Export  orientation  explained  31  of  the  54 
percentage  point  difference,  accounting  for  57  percent  of  the  gap.  The 
Pertamina legacy was of moderate importance. It contributed 18 percentage 
points, accounting for almost a third of  the gap. Concessional interest rates 
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Table 1.1  Average Values and Range of  Values Achieved 
Average  Range of  Values 
Value  for Each Factor 
Hypothetical 1980-82  average total 
debt-service ratio when Indonesia 
had all 3 Mexican features 
Contribution of (in percentage points): 
IGGI  5.8  3.7-8.4 
Maturity management  11.1  12.0-23.8 
Export orientation  30.8  23.6-31.8 
debt-service ratio  30.1 
84.4 
Actual 1980-82  average total 
and currency composition of  debt played only a minor role in reducing the 
DSRs, explaining less than 6 percentage points. 
Our finding that the IGGI effect contributed so little toward the reduction 
of  the  1980-82  debt-service/export ratio is surprising because many of  the 
informed observers we  talked to cited  foreign concessionary loans as the 
primary reason for the absence of  an Indonesian debt crisis. The $1 billion 
saved annually in reduced debt service during 1980-824  is a large sum of 
money, but this amount would have been easily swamped by a Mexico-style 
loss  of  reserves  if  the  Indonesian  government  had  tried  to  prop  up  an 
overvalued  exchange  rate  and  was  then  forced  to  finance capital  flight. 
Similarly, if  exports  were  12 percent  below  actual  value  because  of  an 
overvalued exchange rate, as suggested by the 1965-68  experience, the loss 
in foreign reserves would have also greatly exceeded this $1 billion saving. 
Our conclusion is that the Indonesian exchange rate policy was the most 
important reason Indonesia was able to meet its debt commitments in  the 
1982-84  period.  The  conduct  of  this  exchange  rate  policy  was  greatly 
facilitated by  the existence of  a political lobby that promoted exchange rate 
protection and  by  the  memory  of  the  economy-wide  negative  effects  of 
exchange rate overvaluation. 
While the decline of  oil prices in early 1982 did make debt management 
more difficult-the  total DSR rose from 26 percent in 1981 to 39 percent in 
1982-it  was  still far  from a crisis  situation. The subsequent collapse of 
agricultural commodity prices and the rapid  descent of  the price of  oil in 
1986 produced a more ominous situation. The fall in export earnings from 
$21 billion in 1982 to $15 billion in 1986 caused the total DSR to soar to 68 
percent. The 68 percent appreciation of  the yen against the dollar between 
1985:lQ and 1987:  1Q caused debt-service payments to jump. 
While  our  analysis  would  place  great  emphasis  upon  an  aggressive 
competitive real  exchange rate  policy  to  reduce  the  probability of  a debt 
crisis through its effects on exports and capital flight, we  strongly feel that 
there  are  a  number  of  other  policies  which  must  be  implemented 
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immediately  if  a  debt  crisis  is  to  be  avoided  in  the  medium  run.  We 









Cut budget  deficits  by  controlling  spending and  increasing  taxes.  This 
would keep fiscal policy  consistent with exchange rate policy. 
Maintain an anti-inflationary posture in monetary policy. 
Amend  the  balanced  budget  rule  to  allow  internal  financing  of 
government  deficits.  The deepening of  the domestic market  in  govern- 
ment securities would make open-market operations by the central bank 
easier. The addition of this monetary tool to SBI and SBPU would tend to 
enhance monetary control, and thus macroeconomic  stabilization efforts, 
tremendously. 
Accelerate  the development of  the domestic  financial system. Financial 
deepening  could  be  boosted  by  the  privatization  of  many  of  the 
state-owned  enterprises.  The debt  situation  would  be  improved  if  the 
government  were  to allow  foreigners  to purchase  shares in  the former 
state enterprises. 
Liberalize  controls  on  foreign  investments  in  the  manufacturing  and 
agricultural  sectors, especially  in  industries  that  produce  primarily  for 
export  markets.  In  short,  state  and  private  enterprises  should  issue 
equities instead of bonds to foreign investors when financing their capital 
expenditure. 
Eliminate the  wide  array  of  monopoly  import  licenses.  The growth  of 
manufactured  exports, spurred  by  access  to cheaper inputs,  would  not 
only  increase  foreign  exchange earnings but  would  also  diversify  the 
export bundle, hence reducing the sensitivity of the DSR to the prices of 
a few key commodity exports. 
Expand  the  tree  crop  sector.  In  addition  to  earning  more  foreign 
exchange, the strategy of  accelerating  the growth of  agricultural  export 
industries would also promote a more equitable, rural-urban-as  well as 
inter-island-growth  pattern, and ease population  pressure  on the urban 
areas. 
Political and Economic 
Instability, 1950- 65 
2.1  Introduction 
Indonesia  achieved  formal  recognition  of  its political  independence in 
December 1949 after a bitter, four-year struggle against the Dutch. President 
Soekamo was the dominant political figure in the 1950-65 period. The years 
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